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6278, four have arisen out of strikes. By the decision in the principal
case this avenue of redress has been materially narrowed. If the intent
of the legislature was to strike at all mob violence, then this intent has
been defeated. Gone also is the salutary effect of the law in inducing
the inhabitants of counties to refrain from mob violence on penalty of
increased taxes to pay verdicts secured again~st the county wherein the
mob acted. It would seem that as the law now stands the only persons
entitled to recover under the statute are those persons taken from the
hands of the authorities and cases where the mob "beats" the law-
enforcing agencies to the scene and vents its wrath on a real or supposed
wrongdoer who is thought to have violated the law. Many of these
victims would doubtless be guilty of the offense and deserve legal pun-
ishment. On the other side of the picture are those persons who are
assaulted and lynched by mobs and who are entirely within their legal
rights and guilty of no violation of law, and this fact is at that time
perfectly recognized by the mob who attacks them. But this group is
wholly unprotected. It seems that no distinction should be made to the
prejudice of wholly innocent and law abiding citizens. It is to be hoped
that the court will see its way dear to modify the construction of the
statute so as to include within it those victims of mob violence who are
neither real nor supposed wrongdoers in the sense of having violated
the law. VERNON LEE
DIVORCE
MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE - ACTION OF DIVORCE AND
ALIMONY
The Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County in a decree of
divorce awarded custody of one child to the plaintiff and alimony of
$6o.oo per month for the support of herself and the child, which the
court, at a subsequent term, modified to $45.00 per month. On motion
of the defendant to vacate a judgment for payments in default and to
modify the decree, the court reduced the alimony payments to $20.00
per month for the support of the child until 21 years of age and also
ordered the defendant to pay $25.00 a month on the judgment for
accrued alimony until satisfied. The court of appeals held that the
jurisdiction of the court in cases of alimony was continuing and affirmed
the judgment.'
This note deals with the power of the court to modify decrees of
'Heckert v. Heckert, 57 Ohio App. 421, 14 N.E. (zd) 428 (936).
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absolute divorce. One must distinguish between actions for separate
maintenance and actions for permanent divorce and alimony. In Ohio
this problem is confused by the terms of the statute. An action for
separate maintenance is called one for alimony alone while that for
absolute divorce is for divorce and alimony.2 Most jurisdictions recognize
that the court has continuing jurisdiction to modify the decree in an
action for alimony only.'
After the term in which permanent divorce is granted there is
generally no power in the court to alter a decree except where authority
to do so is reserved in the decree or unless the power is given by statute.4
However, past due installments may not be modified.' A few states
including Ohio have held that the power to modify is impliedly reserved
in the decree when alimony is payable in installments for the support of
the wife,' and, as most jurisdictions would agree, where the decree pro-
,ides for the custody and support of minor children.' Where the decree
is for periodic payments over an indefinite length of time it is necessarily
a decree for continuing control by the courts.' Continuing jurisdiction is
necessary for the welfare of minor children under the unfortunate cir-
cumstances wherein the parents are separated by permanent divorce.'
Where the court has had jurisdiction over the person or property of
the defendant, if a divorce is granted and alimony is not awarded, a
subsequent action for alimony will not be sustained'" since the court may
presume that the rights of the parties were adjudicated in the divorce
action." But in Harlan v. HarlanI2 the court held that it had juris-
diction to grant a support order for the maintenance of the children
Ohio G.C., sec. 11997.
'Got07 v. Gloth, I54 Va. SIX, 153 S.E. 879, 71 A.L.R. 700 (932); Smedley v.
State, 9S Ohio St. x4', ii5 N.E. iozz (1916); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 83 Ohio St. z65, 94N.E. 421, 3S L.R.A. (N.S.) Szi (19xi).
& KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, zd Ed., sec. 765 (9Z3); Ruge v. Ruge, 97
Wash. 5r, x6S Pac. 1063 (1917); Sampson v. Sampson, 16 R.1. 456, 16 Atl. 711, 3
L.R.A. 349 (xSS9); In Noonaw v. Noonaw, 127 Kan. 287, 273 Pac. 409 (i9zg), the
court refused to modify the decree because absolute divorce and alimony are statutory rights
and should be strictly construed5 Bochmer v. Boehmer, z59 Ky. 69, 8z S.W. (zd) 599
(193S), noted 2o Minn. L. Rev. 314 (1936).
'Epps. v. Epps. z28 Ala. 667, 12o So. ISo (sgzg); contra, Plankers v. Plankers,
17S Minn. 31, 2z5 N.W. 913 (i929) (statutory).
Epps v. Eppsj ziS Ala. 667, 120 So. 1So (x9z9); contra, Plankers v. Plankers
GEpps. V. Epps, z5 Ala. 667, 120 So. I5O (1929); Olney v. Watts, 43 Ohio St.
499, 3 N.E. 354 (88).
'Hart v. Hart, 174 Wash. 36, 24 Pac. (2d) 6zo (933); Corbett v. Corbett, 123
Ohio St. 76, 174 N.E. io (1930), aff'd. 36 Ohio App. 32!, 173 N.E. 36 (1930).
Francis v. Francis, 19z Mo. App. 710, 179 S.W. 975 (915).
o Heckcrt v. Hchcrt, 57 Ohio App. 421, 14 N.E. (zd) 428 (1936).
",llarshall v. illarshall, x62 Md. 116, x59 Atd. z6o (1931); O'Brien v. O'Brien,
130 Cal. 409, 6z Pa. 598 (19oo).
"Spain V. Spain, 177 Iowa 249, iXS N.V. 529 (x916); Kamp v. Kamp, 59 N.Y,
21Z (1874).
'- 154 Cal. 341, 98 Pac. 3Z (1908).
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although provision for their care was omitted from the decree. Where
the court does not have jurisdiction to grant alimony due to the fact
that the defendant could not be personally served, some courts do not
allow a subsequent suit for alimony.' 3 But several states either by statute
or otherwise have allowed such an action.' 4 Thus, one might say, in
view of the Ohio decisions, the general rule in Ohio is that the juris-
diction of the court to modify a divorce decree awarding alimony is
continuing subject to certain exceptions. The most troublesome of these
exceptions is found in those cases where the decree is based upon the
agreement of the parties.
Many decrees in divorce actions are based upon an agreement of
the parties providing for property settlements, support of the wife,
custody and support of the minor children. Clearly the incorporation
of an agreement does not prevent the modification of alimony for
support when jurisdiction is expressly reserved in the decree.'" The
majority of the cases hold that the power to modify given by statutes in
most of these jurisdictions is not affected by the fact that the decree is
based on the consent or contract of the parties.'" The arguments in
support of this rule are that the contract is merged into the decree and
thereby loses its contractual nature thus permitting modification;" or
that since the court is not compelled to use the agreement, when it does
employ the decree as evidence of a satisfactory adjustment, this will not
prevent the court from altering the decree.' In some cases a contrary
result is reached on the theory that the court ratifies the contract and on
the principles of contract it cannot modify the decree unless the parties
consent.' But in jurisdictions following this rule usually the incorpora-
tion of an agreement does not preclude the court from modifying the
'
5 Doeksen v. Doeksen, zo2 Iowa 489, Zo N.W. 545 (z9z6); Darby v. Darby,
152 Tenn. 287, 277 S.W. 894 (1925) ; Weidman v. Weidman, 57 Ohio St. 1ot, 48 N.E.
So6 (1897).
14 Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minn. 279, 59 N.W. 1017 (1894), Woods v. Waddle,
44 Ohio St. 449, 8 N.E. 297 (1886) (divorce in foreign jurisdiction); Stephenson v.
Stephenson, 54 Ohio App. 239, 6 N.E. (2d) oo5 (1936) (domestic decree).
'GBeal v. Beal, 218 Cal. 755, 24 Pac. (zd) 768 (x933)i Morgan v. Morgan, 211
Ala. 7, 99 So. 185 (1924). The phrase "until further order of court" is a part of the
decree and must be considered as a part of the agreement. Folz v. "Foiz, 42 Ohio App.
135, 18 N.E. 658 (1932) (action for alimony only).
"e Eddy v. Eddy, 264 Mich. 328, 249 N.W. 868 (1933), note 32 Mich. L. Rev.
701 (1934); Worthington v. Worthington, 224 Ala. 237, 139 So. 334 (1932); Maginnis
v. Maginnis, 323 Il1. 113, 53 N.E. 654 (193o), note 58 A.L.R. 639. The same is true
even of an agreement included in a decree settling property rights. Skinner v. Skinner,
205 Mich. 243, 171 N.W. 383 (1919).
"?Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill 146, 149 N.E. 8zo (i9zS).
as Warren v. Warren, 116 Minn. 458, 133 N.W. OO9 (I9iz).
"Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 141 Atl. 387, S8 A.L.R. 634 (1928); Law v.
Law, 64 Ohio St. 369, 6o N.E. 560 (19o)5 Henderson v. Henderson, 37 Ore. 141,
60 pac. 597, 48 L.R.A. 766, 82 Am. St. Rep. 741 (19oo),
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decree where the decree of support money is for the benefit of minor
children.2 The law upon this point is not clear in Ohio. In Law v.
Law21 the court held that a decree based upon an agreement was not
subject to modification although the support of minor children was
provided for in the decree. This case involved an agreement in which
the father agreed to pay the wife $3,000 a year in monthly installments
for her support and for the support and education of their minor child,
and after the death of the wife to pay $15oo a year in installments to
the daughter until she married. Upon the basis of this decision it would
seem dear that a decree based upon the agreement of the parties which
awards alimony to the spouse may not be modified." A more recent
case decided that the jurisdiction of the court to alter the decree con-
tinues where it provides for the custody, care, and support of minor
children thus permitting an increase in the amount for support awarded
in a decree based on the agreement of the parties.23 The court did not
discuss the effect of the agreement upon the decree, and as a result two
court of appeals cases have held that, while an increase may be permis-
sible, a decree based on a contract may not be decreased.24 In Campbell
v. Campbell," the court felt that to allow a decrease would be an
impairment of the obligation of a contract, and thus was unconstitu-
tional; but an increase might be allowed, so the court said, because the
parent is under a legal obligation to support minor children and there-
fore an increase would be in accord with public policy. This argument
seems to overlook the fact that an increase is quite as much an impair-
ment of the contract and that a parent's duty is to furnish his children
with necessaries according to his financial ability. The dissent pointed
out that public policy might be invoked either way. The state, as a third
party, is interested in the husband's duty to support his wife and children,
which duty survives divorce and is found in alimony and support money
as substitutes.2" If this approach is sound then the agreement of the
parties should be ineffective to defeat the court's power to modify a decree
based upon the parties' agreement providing for support of the wife and
"' Troyer v. Troycr, 177 Wash. SS, 30 Pac. (zd) 963 (1934); Connett v. Connett,
81 Neb. 777, 116 N.W. 658 (x9o8).
2164 Ohio St. 369, 6o N.E. 56o (1go).
22 Cf. Petersine v. Thomas, zS Ohio St. 596 (18 7 6).
22Corbett v. Corbett, 123 Ohio St. 76, 174 N.E. 5o (193o). This case was held as
authority to permit the reduction of a decree based upon agreement in another case decided
without opinion. Nccckirk v. Ncwkirk, 229 Ohio St. S43, 196 N.E. 146 (1935).
24 Fcrger v. Ferger, 46 Ohio App. SSS, 189 N.E. 66S (1934)
, 
noted in 2 O.S.L.J.
49 (1935); Campbell v. Campbell, 46 Ohio App. 197, 1S8 N.E. 300 (1933), noted in
20 Va. L. Rev. 584 (1934).2546 Ohio App. 197, 18 N.E. 300 (1933) noted in 20 Va. L. Rev. 584 (i934).
25SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION & DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 6th. ed., secs.
1796-1797 (192).
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the minor children. In any event an agreement should not be consid-
ered as a final settlement of the rights of minor children not parties to
the arrangement and to which they are incapable of assenting.2
ITHAMAR D. WEED
INSURANCE
AUTOMOBILE INDEMNITY - GUEST STATUTE
The plaintiff while riding as a guest of one Hickok in Michigan
was injured in an automobile accident. She brought action against
Hickok in Ohio. The jury found that the accident was the result of
the wilful and wanton misconduct of the insured, thus taking the case
out of the operation of the Michigan guest statute (Sec. 4648 Compiled
Laws of Michigan (1929) - relieving the owner or operator of liability
except in cases of gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct),
and gave her judgment. Hickok carried liability insurance with the
Yorkshire Indemnity Company of New York and the plaintiff then
filed against it to recover on the previous judgment. A general demurrer
was entered by the company on the ground that the policy covered only
accidental injuries. From a judgment sustaining the demurrer, the
plaintiff appealed. In reversing the judgment, the court, held that the
injuries resulting from the wilful and wanton misconduct of the insured
were accidental within the meaning of the policy. Herrell v. tickok,
57 Ohio App. 213, 13 N. E. (2nd) 358 (I937). The Supreme Court
affirmed the Appellate Court finding that if the Michigan law was as
alleged in the petition, then, under the law of that state, the injuries
were accidentally sustained. The court said it was unnecessary to decide
whether injuries caused by wilful or wanton misconduct would be
covered by the policy in a case arising in Ohio. Herrell v. Hfickok, 133
Ohio St. 66, II N.E. (2nd) 869 (1937).
In the absence of statute the general rule is that an owner or operator
27 The Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal Reform of the Ohio State
Bar Association has accepted the draft of the Marriage and Divorce Commission appointed
by Gov. White, which will probably be submitted to the General Assembly in the near
future. This statute will eliminate the problems discussed in this note. The proposed
divorce law provides that in an action for divorce, alimony, or annulment the court shall
have the power to raise, lower, or otherwise modify an award of alimony for future
support of the spouse if payable in installments, or an award for support money to minor
children either in installments or in a lump sum, whether or not the award was based
upon a contract between the parties. An award to the spouse of a lump sum to be paid in
installments is not subject to modification when such sum is a final property settlement.
The court will also have the power to equitably adjust arrears of such alimony or payment
to minor children which may have accumulated by reason of the inability of the party to
meet such payments. Proposed Divorce Law, sec. 8b, is Ohio Bar z7. (July 18, 1938).
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